Introduction
The 2007 The total magnitude of the economic losses can be estimated with some precision from aggregate economic statistics, such as the national accounts and the flow of funds accounts. In the immediate aftermath of the recession, however, we knew much less about the distribution of those losses across the general population. Information from more detailed surveys about changes in the economic circumstance of households is now becoming available.
I. The Distribution of Wealth Losses
Three nationally representative surveys provide detailed information on the impacts of the recession on individual households: the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), and PSID. The SCF is a triennial survey that focuses on the distribution of wealth and income across households. It normally uses new sample frames for 1 Data are from the quarterly balance sheet for the household sector in the Flow of Funds Accounts. The estimates include nonprofit institutions. (Kennickell, 2011a) . Due to privacy concerns, the micro-survey data from the 2009 re-interview have not yet been publically released, but two Federal Reserve staff articles discussing its major findings are available. The HRS is a biennial longitudinal survey that focuses on individuals aged 50 and over, but the release of the data for 2010 was too late to be included in this study. However, some of the major findings are reported in Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai (2011) . 2 The PSID is a long-standing longitudinal survey, which has been conducted on a biennial schedule since 1999, and the data sets are publically available for both 2007 and 2009, spanning the recession period. It provides extensive information on the wealth, income, employment and other socio-economic characteristics of American families, and it is the major data source for the analysis reported in this paper.
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Prior Analysis. The results from the 2007-09 SCF panel are reported in Bricker and others (2011) and Kennickell (2011) . Using a broad definition of wealth that includes financial and nonfinancial assets (inclusive of vehicles) less outstanding debts, the mean value of net worth declined by 19 percent and the median fell by 23 percent. The average loss is very close to the aggregate estimate from the flow of funds, although there are some differences in coverage.
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2 See also the earlier discussion in Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai (2010) .
One of the most striking findings of the SCF panel is the wide diversity of outcomes across individual households. While most households had losses (62 percent), the median decline was -45 percent, whereas the median gain was 57 percent. Arraying households by the percent of wealth change, the 25 th percentile had a 57 percent loss and the 75 th percentile reported a gain of 27 percent. A contrasting finding, highlighted in the summary shown in proportion not working but not retired, they conclude that the labor market experience of the early boomers was not materially different than that of previous cohorts, and that the recession had only a minor impact on their retirement behavior. Thus, from both the perspective of wealth accumulation and retirement, they conclude that the recession was a minor event for those near retirement.
The major difference relative to the SCF is a 20 percent increase in the value of equities. In part that difference is due to the longer time period in the HRS analysis. The stock market rose in both 2006-07 and 2009-10 with result that there was a much smaller overall fall in equity values. Another striking finding is that a decline in the broad definition of wealth was limited to the top two deciles of the population. Hence, the authors conclude that the "Great Recession" had a relatively modest impact on the early baby-boomers.
Other studies have reported on the consequences of the recession at the level of individual households, but few are able to span the full period of the recession. Hurd and 5 The analysis of the SCF focused on home value rather than owner equity; but using median values of own residence and mortgage debt, the fall in home equity within the SCF seem to be of comparable magnitude.
Rohwedder (2010) The Survey distinguishes among eight asset components: (1) home equity, (2) other real estate, (3) private business/farm, (4) vehicles, (5) transaction accounts, (6) corporate equities, (7) annuities/IRAs, and (8) other savings. All of these assets are defined net of any associated debt.
In addition, information is collected on a ninth category of non-collateralized debt. While the detail is much less than that of the SCF, the net wealth estimates of the PSID correspond very closely to those of the SCF up to about the 95 th percentile of the wealth distribution. As shown in Figure 1 , the estimates of average wealth holdings for the lower 95 percent of all households are virtually identical.
The data underlying the figure excludes vehicles because of a concern about the comparability between the SCF and the PSID in the treatment of leased vehicles and those supplied by a business. However, vehicles are included in the later analysis because they are an important component of the wealth of low-income households.
The correspondence is much worse above the 95 th percentile, however, where the vast bulk of the wealth is concentrated. In recent SCF surveys, over 60 percent of wealth is held by families above the 95 th percentile of the distribution. Because those very wealthy households are underrepresented in the PSID, it accounts for only about two-thirds of the total wealth reported in the SCF.
The PSID has been particularly useful for studies of home ownership because of its ability track individual households over long time periods. The data on home value, mortgage debt and net equity extend back to the 1980s, and the quality of the responses seems high. This is illustrated in Figure The general impression from this overview of the survey responses is that the PSID data do reflect the broad outlines of the historical patterns of change in home prices and the stock market, subject to the qualification that it does not include households at the very top of the wealth distribution.
The PSID does ask respondents to report net purchases and sales of equities in arriving at a measure of the price change, but the quality of the responses is thought to be low. The computation of the change in the S&P index assumes a short lag and uses the average of the 1 st quarter and the 4th quarter of the prior year.
This restriction is imposed to focus on the dynamics of wealth change in the recession rather than treating the two waves as independent cross sections of the population in the two years. The exclusion of the transitional groups, however, results in a sample that is notably older and wealthier than the total. The sample also excludes households with a change in the designated head, which is indicative of a major change in structure, such as death or divorce.
A variety of statistics could be used to summarize the changes in wealth between two or more waves. For example, many studies rely on the median as the primary measure of the typical value since it reduces the influence of extremes. The conditional median, a variant used in the triennial reports of the SCF, focuses on the proportion of households that have a specific asset and the median holdings of those who do. It is a favored measure in situations where a few households have large holdings-particularly, when more than half of all households report zero holdings of some assets. However, medians are not additive, so the sum of the medians of components may be a poor guide to the median of total wealth. Also, in a comparison between two points in time the medians can represent very different households: it is not a match of like with like. Means are additive for a given population and the change in the means is a meaningful measure of the change for the group over time. Particularly in a panel survey, it is a comparison of like with like. The difference between the mean and the median can also be interpreted as a measure of the skewness of the distribution: if the mean rises more rapidly than the median, it
suggests that values rose more rapidly at the top of the distribution.
In the case of the current focus on the change in wealth, there is also considerable appeal to a third statistic, the median change. It can only be computed for a panel because it requires the initial computation of the change in a wealth component for each household in the sample, and those changes are then sorted by size. Thus, the median change emphasized the dynamic element of a panel by comparing the same households at two points in time, and it is relatively insensitive to extreme values. In contrast, the changes in the mean and median make no use of the panel dimension and could be equally-well computed from independent cross sections. The median change was the principal measure used in Bricker and others (2011) for their analysis of the SCF panel. and -15 percent. The losses are somewhat smaller than the comparable estimates from the SCF, which ranged from -18 to -23 for the three different metrics.
The changes in net worth by selected socio-economic characteristics are shown in the lower portions of the table. The three alternative measures of the percent change display more substantial differences. The overall conclusion is comparable to the results reported for the SCF panel: substantial losses across a wide range of socio-economic groups. However, in individual instances the measures of the change are much more volatile. This is somewhat surprising in view of the larger sample size in the PSID. However, it is consistent with earlier analyses that suggest that the wealth estimates of the PSID are subject substantial measurement error (Bosworth and Smart, 2009 ). The variability is most marked for percentiles of income and percentiles of wealth, and it is most likely due to the fact that the estimates of income and wealth are subject to significant transitory variation-unlike age, education and region-and they are more likely to include substantial measurement error. They also display the largest differences relative to those of the SCF. For example, the percent change in the mean cannot be meaningfully displayed for the bottom third of the wealth distribution because net worth is negative in 2007. In addition, the change in the mean is positive for the middle third of the distribution, and the change in the median is a large positive for the bottom third.
The importance of the transitory factors can be illustrated by using a more permanent The result is large revisions to the changes in the mean and median that bring them much closer to the values for the median change.
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Overall, the conclusions are similar to the SCF in that, despite the very wide variations in individual wealth changes, the magnitudes of average wealth loss are analogous across a wide range of different socio-economic categories. However, it also appears that the wealth estimates are more volatile than those of the SCF. While they are not presented in this paper, the components of wealth, except for home equity, seem particularly subject to excessive volatility.
However, the requirement that the household be included for three successive waves does reduce the sample size by about a thousand, and it substantially alters the estimates for the youngest age group and those with less than a high school education.
II. Implications for Retirement
The magnitude of the recession and the associated wealth loss had the potential to significantly alter retirement decisions. The recession itself greatly increased the number of job losers and reduced the number of job openings, making it much harder to find a new job. The resulting discouraged-worker effects might increase rates of exit from the labor market. Such an option would be most attractive to workers of retirement age. On the other hand, the large wealth losses associated with the recession pull in the opposite direction. The fall in asset prices might induce some workers to delay retirement and others to return to the work force. The
Current Population Survey provides a wealth of information on changes in labor force status and retirement over the business cycle (Bosworth and Burtless, 2010) . However, there is very little information about the wealth of workers in such surveys, and how they might have been impacted by the fall in asset values, forcing researchers to rely on economy-wide measures.
Coile and Levine (2010) combined data from the March CPS, the S&P stock price index, and data on state unemployment and home prices, and conclude that changes in stock market prices do affect retirement decisions, but that the impact is substantially smaller than the effect of weak labor market conditions. They observed no influence of changes in home prices. Bosworth and Burtless examined data from the monthly CPS and reached similar conclusions. However, the wealth data used in those studies refers to the economy as a whole and could be reflective of a large number of other macroeconomic developments. Goda, Shoven, and Slavov (2011) There has been a much stronger and continuing upward trend in the labor force participation rate of older women, which is usually attributed to the large changes in the role of women in the economy and society in general. However, while the participation rate of younger women peaked in 2000, the participation rate continued to rise for women aged 55-70 until 2011
when it registered a small decline. The small fall in the participation rates for both men and women since the recession suggests that the "discouraged worker" effects of the recession have exceeded the impact of reduced wealth. However, the household level data of the PSID allows a more detailed exploration of the issue. In each wave the household respondent is asked about the current employment status of the head and spouse, distinguishing among: employed, unemployed, retired, disabled or out of the labor force for other reasons. For those individuals who were in the workforce (employed or looking for work) in the first wave, the table shows their status in year 3 (the second wave). In addition, the table distinguishes between men and women and those who are above and below age 55, where the probabilities of retirement begin to change substantially.
The changes in labor force status are quite different for individuals age 55 and over, as shown in the bottom portion of the table. The proportion exiting the labor force in year 3 is substantially larger, and it appears to show greater sensitivity to the business cycle for both men and women. For women over the age of 55, the rate of exit in year 3 averages 20 percent over the past decade and more than two-thirds was due to retirement. The exit rate and the rate of retirement both jumped in the recessions of 2001 and 2009. There is also a jump in the proportion that left the labor force for reasons other than retirement or disability, but it remains well below that of younger women. There is an even larger rise in the exit rate for men over age 55, and it is more than accounted for by increased retirement. Again, there is evidence of a large cyclical response. In comparing the change for men who were in the workforce in 2007 with the comparable group in 2005, there was a 10 percentage point reduction in the employment rate in 11 The employed and unemployed in year 1 are combined because of the small number of observations on the unemployed. Similarly, it is possible to report on those who were out of the labor force in year 1, but only a small number (≈ 5 percent) transition back into the workforce in year 3. Individual workers are limited to heads of households and spouses to provide a match with household wealth. year 3, more than a doubling of the number transitioning into unemployment (4.5 versus 1.4) and a 7 percentage point rise in the proportion that left the workforce.
The data of Table 4 suggest there was a sharp increase in the rate of retirement of in 2009, and it is at least suggestive that discouraged worker effects, related to conditions in the labor market, dominated the delaying effect of large wealth losses. In addition, the behavior of workers approaching retirement ages seems quite different from that of younger workers.
Determinants of Retirement.
A probit model is used to explore further the determinants of workers' decision to retire. The data are restricted to individuals who were in the labor force in the first wave, as with the above transitions, but the individuals' ages are limited to 55-69 to provide a reasonably homogeneous group of potential retirees-a sample size of 4,590 cases. The binary outcome variable is defined as 1 if the respondent is retired in year 3, and 0 for all other transition states. The prediction model includes indicator variables reflecting each respondent's age in 5-year categories, educational attainment, marital status, whether they have a working spouse, and a measure of their permanent income (defined as the average of household income in the three survey waves corresponding to t =0, t+2 and t-2). In addition, the specification includes the unemployment rate in the respondent's state in year 3 as the measure of labor market conditions. Finally, the regressions include the ratio of household wealth to permanent income in the initial and terminal waves. Alternative specifications of the wealth change add the change in home equity.
The basic regression results are shown in Table 5 . The combined sample of men and women is reported in column (1), and separate regressions for men and women are reported in columns (2) and (3). The coefficients on the indicator variables are shown at the top of the table.
Married individuals tend to retire earlier than those who are single, but a working spouse reduces the probability of retirement. Household wealth is scaled by the previously-discussed measure of permanent income, and the coefficients on wealth in the terminal and initial years are both positive, suggesting that the large wealth losses in 2009 would have induced individual to continue working and delay retirement. However, only the coefficient on current wealth is statistically significant in the combined regression and wealth is insignificant in the regression for men. More important, the effect of wealth is much weaker than that of labor market conditions. For ease of interpretation, the regressions include a standard national measure of the unemployment rate for workers aged 25-54 in the first half of each survey year. That is combined with the differential of the state unemployment rate over the national rate. There is a strong positive effect of national-level unemployment on retirement, but there is also an important influence of unemployment at the state level. Both the wealth and labor market effects are more significant for women than for men. Finally, the fourth regression reports the results of separating household wealth between home equity and other wealth. The coefficients current and lagged home equity are positive; suggesting that the collapse of the housing bubble did induce some households to postpone retirement by more than would have been expected from the overall wealth loss alone. The effect of variations in home equity is larger than for other forms of wealth, but only the coefficient on lagged home equity displays much statistical significance. Because the magnitude of the wealth holdings is correlated between the initial and terminal years, we also performed a joint test of the statistical significant of wealth in both periods. The result is some increase in statistical significance, but wealth still has an insignificant role in the determination of retirement by older men.
The results differ is some respects from the prior research. In contrast to Bosworth and Burtless (2010) , which relied on data from the CPS, this analysis of the PSID finds statistically- 
II. Conclusion
Our examination of the wealth and employment data from the PSID suggests that the survey captured the major elements of the 2007-09 recession. There are large reported wealth losses that are shared across a broad range of socio-economic groups. The magnitude and widespread nature of the wealth losses generally corresponds with the findings of the SCF.
Second, we find a large rise in the rate of transition out of the labor force into retirement in 2007-09 for older workers. In contrast, younger workers tended to remain in the workforce and a larger portion of the decline in employment was absorbed by increased unemployment. Thus, the decline in the labor force participation rate was largely accounted for by the response of older workers. Third, the more formal analysis of retirement decisions over the 1999-2009 period suggests that retirement decisions were influenced both by variations in household wealth and labor market conditions, but that the labor market was the more important determinant. 
